
Available in Russian
Author: Alexei Kartsov
DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2023-4-147-162
Keywords: constitutionalization; private law; discourse of fundamental rights; horizontal effect of fundamental rights; indirect effect of fundamental rights; direct effect of fundamental rights
The article analyzes foreign doctrinal approaches to the influence of constitutionalization on the private law of countries belonging to the Romano-Germanic and Anglo-Saxon legal systems and primarily to the prevailing form of this influence, which is the discourse of fundamental rights. This discourse affects private law in the modalities of subordination (direct horizontal effect or direct effect) and complementarity (indirect horizontal effect or indirect effect). The first modality, in which fundamental rights directly affect relations between individuals, is characterized by private law’s loss of regulatory and methodological autonomy. In the case of the second modality, autonomy is preserved and the influence of the discourse of fundamental rights occurs indirectly, through the reinterpretation of individual legal mechanisms by higher courts. Three approaches are distinguished in discussion of these issues. The first approach is represented by enthusiasts who believe that constitutionalization contributes to the modernization of civil law, making it more flexible and relevant to modern conditions and mitigating the adverse consequences of the privatization of public services in the transition from a welfare state to a “service state”. The second approach is that of legal realists who are convinced that constitutionalization, without affecting the essence of judicial decisions, only modifies the arsenal of arguments available to judges in both moderate (indirect effect) and radical (direct effect) expressions. The third approach encompasses the entire spectrum of criticism of the constitutionalization of private law, from moderate pessimism regarding its individual manifestations to uncompromising rejection of the whole. The conclusion is justified that under the guise of the discourse of fundamental rights, basic values that are fundamental for private legal relations (equality of parties, freedom of contract, and private autonomy) should not be distorted or devalued. Therefore the preferable form of promoting the discourse of fundamental rights is by indirect effect, which preserves the autopoiesis of private law and does not neglect the methods of resolving conflicts of interests and rights developed within it.
About the author: Alexei Kartsov – Doctor of Sciences in Law, Professor, Northwestern Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Saint Petersburg, Russia.
Citation: Kartsov A. (2023) Nit’ Ariadny ili doroga v nikuda? Diskurs osnovnykh prav v zarubezhnom chastnom prave [Thread of Ariadne or road to nowhere? Discourse of fundamental rights in foreign private law]. Sravnitel’noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 147–162. (In Russian).
References
Barak A. (1996) Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law. Review of Constitutional Studies / Revue d’études constitutionnelles, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 218–281.
Barak A. (2012) Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Berlin I. (2001) Filosofiya svobody. Evropa [The philosophy of freedom. Europe], Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie. (In Russian).
Blackstone W. (1979) Commentaries on the Laws of England, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Bonilla D. (2011). Liberalism and Property in Colombia: Property as a Right and Property as a Social Function. Fordham Law Review, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 1135–1170.
Borges de Oliveira E.A. (2020) Lines about Constitutional Healing Problem. Revista de Direito Brasileira, vol. 25, no. 10, pp. 3–16.
Cherednychenko O.O. (2007) Fundamental Rights and Private Law: A Relationship of Subordination or Complementarity? Utrecht Law Review, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 1–25.
Cohen-Eliya M., Porat I. (2013) Proportionality and Constitutional Culture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Collins H. (2012) On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights. Discourse and Private Law: LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 7/2012, London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Available at: https://www.lse.ac.uk/law/working-paper-series/2007-08/WPS2012-07-Collins.pdf (accessed: 01.09.2023).
Diederichsen U. (1998) Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als oberstes Zivilgericht – ein Lehrstück der juristischen Methodenlehre. Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, vol. 198, no. 2/3, pp. 171–260.
Dos Santos Cunha A. (2011) The Social Function of Property in Brazilian Law. Fordham Law Review, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 1171–1181.
Dworkin R. (1977) Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth.
Eller K.H. (2020) Comparative Genealogies of “Contract and Society”. German Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 7, pp. 1393–1410.
Gerstenberg O. (2004) Private Law and the New European Constitutional Settlement European Law Journal, vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 766–786.
Greene J. (2018) A Private Law Court in a Public Law System. The Law & Ethics of Human Rights, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 37–72.
Kommers D.P. (1997) The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2nd ed., Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Kumm M. (2006) Who is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law. German Law Journal, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 341–369.
Manganaro F. (2013) The Right of Property in the Italian Legal System and in the European Convention of Human Rights: A Conflict to Be Resolved. Available at: http://www.ius-publicum.com/repository/uploads/04_09_2013_14_55-Prof.-F.-Manganaro.pdf (accessed: 01.09.2023).
Rodotà S. (1969) Le fonti di integrazione del contratto, Milano: Giuffrè.
Scalia A. (1995) Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws. In: Scalia A. A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 3–47.
Schäfer H.-B., Aksoy H.C. (2016) Alive and Well: The Good Faith Principle in Turkish Contract Law. European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 42, pp. 73–101.
Smits J. (2006) Private Law and Fundamental Rights: A Sceptical View. In: Barkhuysen T., Lindenbergh S. (eds.) Constitutionalisation of Private Law, Leiden; Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 9–22.
Stone Sweet А. (2000) Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stone Sweet A., Mathews J. (2008) Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 47, pp. 68–149.
Taylor G. (2002) The Horizontal Effect of Human Rights Provisions, the German Model and Its Applicability to Common-Law Jurisdictions. King’s Law Journal, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 187–218.
Thomsons S. (2017) Judicial Review and Public Law: Challenging the Preconceptions of a Troubled Taxonomy. Melbourne University Law Review, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 890–927.
Tushnet M. (2003) The Issue of State Action / Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law. International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 79–98.
Winkler A. (2006) Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts. Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 793–871.
Zor’kin V.D. (2012) Konstitutsionnyy Sud i razvitie grazhdanskogo prava [The Constitutional Court and the development of civil law]. Rossiyskiy sud’ya, no. 3, pp. 5–13. (In Russian).