Is it time to understand Russia rationally? Test of suitability in constitutional adjudication

---

The author discusses the application of the suitability test in constitutional adjudication. Then he puts forward a thesis that in comparison with the essentially philosophical categories of reasonableness and rationality, this prong of proportionality principle has practical value in judicial review of legislation. The political system has to meet the minimum standards of a deliberative democracy in order courts could use the doctrine of rationality. Among such standards are: recognition of the diversity of ideologies, real competition between political parties and other groups, a serious attitude towards discussion in society, etc. High courts, even in countries with long democratic traditions, usually use the self-restraint technique in reviewing the reasonableness of statutes. In illiberal and populist regimes, due to the unification of public discourse and the imitation of democratic institutions, the challenging of reasonableness of majority decisions can be dangerous. The argument on absurdity of legislation is relatively rare in the case-law of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. It can be found in the dissenting opinions of constitutional judges. In regard with the recent legislative ban on the publication of these opinions, the reasoning ad absurdum has rather theoretical significance for constitutional adjudication in Russia. Moreover, criticism of the reasonableness of legislation can now create additional obstacles for the difficult dialogue of the Russian Constitutional Court with the parliament and other “political” branches. An alternative to critically reviewing the unreasonableness of parliamentary decisions in constitutional adjudication are both the borrowing of economic methodology and certain principles of Legisprudence. The author puts forward the argument on utility of these principles on the judicial review of the ability of legislative means to achieve public goals. Suitability has an empirical nature and requires scientific validity of statutes. Selection of regulatory measures should be evidence-based and grounded on outcomes of research. Usually, constitutional judges do not have special knowledge of complex issues of socio-economic policy. More often than not, the absence of such an expertise means deference to the parliamentary and administrative fact-finding, which predetermined the normative decision. The intensity of the review of the suitability of legislation can be increased in those areas where constitutional judges have the necessary expertise or practical background. Constitutional tribunals recognize the broad discretion of representative bodies in forecasting the social, economic and other consequences. Otherwise, the intervention of judges in the goal-setting of regulatory policy is inevitable. Forecasting can be inaccurate and even erroneous due to the targeting of the regulatory decision for the future. A second-guess of the legislative forecast in constitutional adjudication is an exception to the general rule. It is possible due to newly discovered circumstances, changes taking place in society or progress in science. The implementation of regulatory impact assessment in law-making does not replace, but supplements the judicial review of the principle of proportionality. Consistency test in constitutional adjudication is closely related to the principle of legal certainty, which in turn excludes inconsistency and contradictions of legislative measures with public aims. The consistency approach obliges the members of parliament to be logical in the implementation of the legislative intent. Otherwise, citizens’ legitimate expectations in the governmental policy are undermined. The suitability test has an applied meaning in discrimination cases. If unequal treatment affects the fundamental rights of truly vulnerable social groups, constitutional judges could increase the intensity of judicial review of unreasonable laws.

About the author: Aleksei Dolzhikov – Candidate of Sciences (Ph.D.) in Law, Associate Professor of the Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law at Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, Russia.

Citation: Dozhikov A. (2020) Uzhe pora umom Rossiyu ponimat'? Trebovanie prigodnosti v konstitutsionnom pravosudii [Is it time to understand Russia rationally? Test of suitability in constitutional adjudication]. Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, vol.29, no.6, pp.79–114. (In Russian).

References

(2020) Regulatory Impact Assessment. OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy, Paris: OECD Publishing.

Alekseev S.S. (1995) Osnovy pravovoy politiki v Rossii: kurs lektsiy [Foundations of legal policy in Russia: a course of lectures], Ekaterinburg; Moscow: De-Yure. (In Russian).

Alexy R. (1989) A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification, R.M.Adler, N.MacCormick (transl.), Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press.

Alexy R. (2002) A Theory of Constitutional Rights, J.Rivers (transl.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Belov S.A. (2016) Ratsional'nost' sudebnoy balansirovki konstitutsionnykh tsennostey s pomoshch'yu testa na proportsional'nost' [The rationality of the judicial balancing of constitutional values using the proportionality test]. Peterburgskiy yurist, no.1, pp.63–75. (In Russian).

Belov S.A. (2017) Razumnost' i ratsional'nost' v konstitutsionnom prave [Reasonableness and rationality in constitutional law]. Rossiyskiy yuridicheskiy zhurnal, vol.115, no.4, pp.9–22. (In Russian).

Blankenagel A. (2009) Konstitutsionnoe ponimanie i funktsii ekonomicheski obosnovannykh nalo­gov s tochki zreniya spetsialista iz Germanii [Constitutional interpretation and functions of economically reasonable taxes from German specialist’s perspective]. Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, vol.18, no.5, pp.67–76. (In Russian).

Blankenagel A. (2016) «An Russland kann man nur glauben». Vom Scheitern der Reformen [Abschiedsvorlesung]. Merkur, vol.70, no.811, pp.19–30.

De Búrca G. (1997) Proportionality and Wednesbury Unreasonableness: The Influence of European Legal Concepts on UK Law. European Public Law, vol.3, no.4, pp.561–586.

Busova N.A. (2002) Deliberativnaya model' demokratii i politika interesov [Deliberative model of democracy and the policy of interests]. Voprosy filosofii, no.5, pp.44–54. (In Russian).

Bustamante T. (2013) On the Argumentum ad absurdum in Statutory Interpretation: Its Uses and Normative Significance. In: Dahlman Ch., Feteris E.T. (eds.) Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, Dordrecht; New York: Springer, pp.21–43.

Carnielli W., Malinowski J. (eds.) (2018) Contradictions, from Consistency to Inconsistency, Cham: Springer.

Chemerinsky E. (2016) The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and Desirable). Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy, vol.14, no.2, pp.401–417.

Chirninov A. (2020) Puti – ispovedimy? Argument k posledstviyam i ego ispol'zovanie v praktike konstitutsionnogo pravosudiya [Does God move in a mysterious way? The argument from consequences and its use in constitutional justice]. Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, vol.29, no.2, pp.33–57. (In Russian).

Cohen-Eliya M., Porat I. (2011) Proportionality and the Culture of Justification. The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol.59, no.2, pp.463–490.

Craig P. (1999) Unreasonableness and Proportionality in UK Law. In: Ellis E. (ed.) The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe, Oxford: Hart, pp.85–106.

Dann P. (2010) Verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle gesetzgeberischer Rationalität. Der Staat, vol.49, no.4, pp.630–646.

Dryzek J.S. (1990) Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dudko I.A., Kryazhkova O.N. (2020) Zashchita prav i svobod cheloveka i grazhdanina v Rossiy­skoy Federatsii: uchebnoe posobie [Protection of human rights and civil liberties in the Russian Federation: a study guide], Moscow: Rossiyskiy gosudarstvennyy universitet pravosudiya.

Dyzenhaus D. (2014) Proportionality and Deference in a Culture of Justification. In: Huscroft G., Miller B.W., Webber G. (eds.) Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.234–258.

Ehlers D., Becker U. et al. (eds.) (2007) European Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Berlin: De Gruyter Recht.

Fishkin J.S. (2009) When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Gadzhiev G.A. (2016) E.V.Vas'kovskiy i sovremennaya tsivilisticheskaya metodologiya [E.V.Vaskov­sky and contemporary civilistic methodology]. Zhurnal rossiyskogo prava, vol.236, no.8, pp.57–64.

Gutmann A., Thompson D. (2004) Why Deliberative Democracy? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Habermas J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, W.Rehg (transl.), Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hauser G.A., Grim A. (eds.) (2003) Rhetorical Democracy: Discursive Practices of Civic Engagement, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Holland J.A., Webb J. (2013) Learning Legal Rules: A Students’ Guide to Legal Method and Reasoning, 8th ed., New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ivlev Yu.V. (2003) Osnovy logicheskoy teorii argumentatsii [Foundations of the logical theory of argumentation]. Logicheskie issledovaniya, no.10, pp.50–60.

Khramova T. (2020) Ispytanie pandemiey: ogranicheniya svobody sobraniy i slova v svete printsipa proportsional'nosti [The challenges of the pandemic: restrictions of freedoms of assembly and speech in the light of the proportionality principle]. Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, vol.29, no.4, pp.36–54.

Kumm M. (2010) The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: the Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review. Law and Ethics of Human Rights, vol.4, no.2, pp.142–175.

Lazarev V.V. (2014) Disseminatsiya nauki v Konstitutsionnom Sude RF [Dissemination of science in the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation]. In: Syrykh V.M., Vlasenko V.N. (eds.) Pravovoe gosudarstvo i pravosudie: problemy teorii i praktiki [Rule of law and courts: problems of theory and practice], Moscow: Rossiyskaya akademia pravosudiya, pp.14–28. (In Russian).

Leisner A. (1999) Geeignetheit als Rechtsbegriff. Ein Beitrag zur Dogmatik des Rechtsstaatsprinzips, dargestellt am Beispiel nicht durchgesetzter Parkverbote. Die Öffentliche Verwaltung, vol.19, pp.807–815.

Mader L. (2003) Otsenka zakonodatel'stva – vklad v povyshenie kachestva zakonov [Assessment of legislation – a contribution to improving the quality of laws]. In: Ivliev G.P., Ilna N.V. (eds.) Otsenka zakonov i effektivnosti ikh prinyatiya [Assessment of statutes and the effectiveness of their adoption], Moscow: Izdanie gosudarstvennoy dumy Duma, pp.25–35.

Mal'ko A.V. (2012) Nauchnaya obosnovannost' i prognozirovanie kak vazhneyshie printsipy sovremennoy rossiyskoy pravovoy politiki [Scientific validity and forecasting as the most important principles of modern Russian legal policy]. Pravovaya politika i pravovaya zhizn', no.1, pp.8–14. (In Russian).

Mal'ko A.V. (2012) Printsipy sovremennoy rossiyskoy pravovoy politiki [Principles of modern Russian law policy]. Pravo i upravlenie. XXI vek, vol.22, no.1, pp.3–9. (In Russian).

Mathis K. (2011) Consequentialism in Law. In: Mathis K. (ed.) Efficiency, Sustainability, and Justice to Future Generations, Dordrecht; New York; Berlin : Springer, pp.3–29.

Moran M. (2006) Protesting Too Much: Rational Basis Review under Canada’s Equality Guarantee. In: McIntyre Sh., Rodgers S. (eds.) Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths, pp.71–93.

Nikiforov B.S. (ed.) (1979) Latinskaya yuridicheskaya frazeologiya [Latin legal phraseology], Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura.

Peiris G.L. (1987) Wednesbury Unreasonableness: The Expanding Canvas. The Cambridge Law Journal, vol.46, no.1, pp.53–82.

Peters A., Altwicker T. (2012) Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention: Mit rechtsvergleichenden Bezügen zum deutschen Grundgesetz, München: Beck.

Petersen N. (2013) Avoiding the Common-Wisdom Fallacy: The Role of Social Sciences in Constitutional Adjudication. International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol.11, no.2, pp.294–318.

Petrazhitsky L.I. (1907) Teoriya prava i gosudarstva v svyazi s teoriey nravstvennosti [The theory of law and state in connection with the theory of morality], Saint Petersburg: Printing house of Joint Stock Company “Slovo”. (In Russian).

Petrazhitsky L.I. (1908) Vvedenie v izuchenie prava i nravstvennosti [Introduction to the study of law and morality], Saint Petersburg: Tipografiya Yu.N.Ehrlich.

Poskonin V.V., Poskonina O.V. (2007) Znachimost' ponyatiya “diskurs” v modeli deliberativnoy demokratii [The importance of concept of “discourse” in model of deliberative democracy]. Vestnik Udmurtskogo universiteta. Seriya “Ekonomika i pravo”, no.6, pp.41–56.

Rudenko V. (2007) Konsul'tativnye obshchestvennye sovety v sisteme deliberativnoy demokratii. [Consultative public councils in the system of deliberative democracy]. Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, vol.16, no.4, pp.116–124.

Safarov R.A. (1969) Prognozirovanie i yuridicheskaya nauka [Forecasting and legal science]. Sovet­skoe gosudarstvo i pravo, no.3, pp.93–102. (In Russian).

Shargorodskiy M.D. (1971) Prognoz i pravovaya nauka [Forecast and legal science]. Pravovedenie, no.1, pp.40–50. (In Russian).

Sivitskiy V.A. (2017) Kollizii kak bolezn' rosta soderzhatel'nosti pravovogo regulirovaniya: metody “profilaktiki” i “lecheniya” [Collisions as a growing pain in the scope of legal regulation: methods of “prevention” and “remedy”]. In: Baranov V.M. (ed.) Yuridicheskaya tekhnika: Ezhegodnik. Vypusk 11: Kollizii zakonodatel'nykh interpretatsionnykh, pravoprimenitel'nykh aktov: doktrina, praktika, tekhnika preodoleniya [Conflicts of legislative interpretation, law enforcement documents: doctrine, practice, overcoming technique], Nizhniy Novgorod: Nizhegorodskaya Akademiya MVD Rossii, pp.308–314. (In Russian).

Starodubtseva I.A. (2015) Konstitutsionno-pravovoe prognozirovanie v pravotvorchestve kak sposob predotvrashcheniya yuridicheskikh kolliziy [Constitutional legal forecasting in the law-making as means of the conflict of laws prevention]. Aktual'nye problemy rossiyskogo prava, vol.52, no.3, pp.51–57. (In Russian).

Tikhomirov Yu.A. (2014) Prognozy i riski v pravovoy sfere [Predictions and risks in the legal sphere]. Zhurnal rossiyskogo prava, vol.207, no.3, pp.5–16. (In Russian).

Tyutchev F.I. (1965) Lirika. T.2. [Lyrics. Vol.2], Moscow: Nauka.

Van Huk M. (2013) Konstitutsionnye sudy i deliberativnaya demokratiya [Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy]. Pravovedenie, no.2, pp.135–149. (In Russian).

Voßkuhle A. (2015) Printsip sorazmernosti [The principle of proportionality], A.Dolzhikov (transl.). Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, no.1, pp.159–163. (In Russian).

Wintgens L.J., Oliver-Lalana A.D. (eds.) (2013) The Rationality and Justification of Legislation: Essays in Legisprudence, Cham; Heidelberg: Springer.

Zaytsev A.V. (2013) Deliberativnaya demokratiya, dialog i ikh mesto v konstellyatsii diskursa publich­noy politiki [Deliberative Democracy, Dialogue and Their Place in the Constellation of Public Policy Discourse]. Nauchnye vedomosti Belgorodskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Istoriya. Politologiya. Tom 27, vol.158, no.15, pp.147–153.