Author: András Sajó
DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2026-1-5-17
Keywords: rule of law; legality; formal and substantive conceptions; rationality; honesty.
Legality alone is insufficient to protect freedom and democracy. The rule of law is more than simple legality, it must be understood as a tradition-based practice that tempers arbitrary power. Legalism — mere obedience to enacted norms — has repeatedly enabled oppression, most notably under authoritarian and populist regimes that manipulate legality while hollowing out its moral and rational foundations. Against this, the present moral-formal conception of the rule of law emphasizes structured legality, professional legal tradition, rationality, procedural fairness, and minimal public morality. These elements constrain power not by imposing contested substantive values, but by shaping the form and operation of law itself. Drawing on Fuller’s internal morality of law, historical experience, and jurisprudential debate, this article shows how violations of formal rule-of-law requirements generate legal pathologies and enable abuse. The moral-formal rule of law, though “thin”, provides indispensable protection against arbitrariness, sustains human dignity, and preserves ordered liberty. Its resilience lies in shared legal culture, interpretive discipline, and continuity over time. While vulnerable to distortion, the formal rule of law remains the most reliable framework for resisting legalized oppression and maintaining a legal order worthy of respect.
About the author: András Sajó – Doctor of Law, Member of Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Judge and Vice-President of the European Court of Human Rights (2008–2017).
Citation: Sajó A. (2026) For a rational and honest rule of law. Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 5–17.
References
Barak A. (2006) The Judge in a Democracy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Barak A. (2007) Purposive Interpretation in Law, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bingham T. (2010) The Rule of Law, London; New York: Allen Lane.
Böckenförde E.-W. (1991) State, Society, and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law, New York; Oxford: Berg.
Craig P. (2016) Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework. In: Bellamy R. (ed.) The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers, Abingdon; New York: Routledge, pp.95–115.
Elias N. (2012) On the Process of Civilization, Dublin: University College Dublin Press.
Fabbrini F., Sajó A. (2019) The Dangers of Constitutional Identity. European Law Journal, vol.25, no.4, pp.457–473.
Fallon R.H., Jr. (1997) “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse. Columbia Law Review, vol.97, no.1, pp.1–56.
Fuller L.L. (1969) The Morality of Law, rev. ed., New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Ginsburg T., Versteeg M. (2017) Constitutional Correlates of the Rule of Law. In: Adams M., Meuwese A., Hirsch Ballin E. (eds.) Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law: Bridging Idealism and Realism, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.506–525.
Hart H.L.A. (1958) Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals. Harvard Law Review, vol.71, no.4, pp.593–629.
Hegel G.W.F. (1896) Philosophy of Right, S.W.Dyde (transl.), London: G.Bell & Sons.
Hobbes T. (1996) Leviathan, R.Tuck (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
James W. (1909) The Meaning of Truth, London: Longmans, Green & Co.
Jouanjan O. (2006) Justifier l’injustifiable. Astérion, vol.4. Available at: https://journals.openedition.org/asterion/643 (accessed: 22.01.2026).
Krygier M. (2021) Illiberalism and the Rule of Law. In: Sajó A., Uitz R., Holmes S. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, New York; Abingdon: Routledge, pp.533–553.
Krygier M. (2024) Well-Tempered Power: “A Cultural Achievement of Universal Significance”. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, vol.16, no.3, pp.479–507.
MacCormick N. (1984) Coherence in Legal Justification. In: Peczenik A. et al. (eds.) Theory of Legal Science, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp.235–251.
Palombella G. (2009) The Rule of Law and Its Core. In: Palombella G., Walker N. (eds.) Relocating the Rule of Law, Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, pp.17–42.
Palombella G. (2014) The Law’s Two Sides and Their Benefits: Domestic to International Context (and from Hamdan to Al Jedda): Sant’Anna Legal Studies Research Paper 1/2014. Available at: https://minisiti.santannapisa.it/app/uploads/sites/21/2020/10/palombella_stals.pdf (accessed: 22.01.2026).
Raz J. (1971) The Identity of Legal Systems. California Law Review, vol.59, no.3, pp.795–815.
Raz J. (1979) The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, New York: Oxford University Press.
Scarpelli U. (1965) Cos’é il positivismo giuridico, Milano: Edizioni di Comunità.
Shklar J.N. (1987) Political Theory and The Rule of Law. In: Hutchinson A., Monahan P.J. (eds.) The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology, Toronto: Carswell, pp.1–16.
Thompson E.P. (1977) Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act, Harmondsworth: Penguin Peregrine.
Thompson E.P. (1995) Poverty of Theory, or an Orrery of Errors, London: Merlin Press.
Tuori K. (2023) Pacta Sunt Servanda. Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, vol.2, no.1, pp.44–57.
Ullmann-Margalit E. (2017) Normal Rationality: Decisions and Social Order, A.Margalit, C.R.Sunstein (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.