Populism and the balance of constitutional democracy

In the context of intensifying political fragmentation and the erosion of traditional structures of representative democracy, populism has emerged as a systemic force reshaping the constitutional landscape. Rather than viewing populism as a transient political anomaly, this paper conceptualizes it as a long-term internal stress test for constitutional democracy — one that directly affects the equilibrium between popular sovereignty and the rule of law. Through a comparative analysis of Poland, Hungary, and Romania, the study identifies three distinct trajectories of populist pressure on constitutional courts: institutional paralysis (Poland), structural reconfiguration accompanied by the normalized subordination of judicial institutions to political majorities (Hungary), and cyclical delegitimation driven by the court’s active involvement in political processes (Romania). A central focus of the paper is the phenomenon of judicial populism, understood as the internalization of populist logic within the constitutional court itself. Such internal dynamics manifest through rhetorical appeals to “the people” instead of traditional legal reasoning, as well as through strategic synchronization of judicial decisions with electoral cycles, increasing media-orientation of judicial actors, and various forms of opportunistic institutional self-preservation. Unlike externally imposed political pressures, judicial populism erodes the autonomy of the constitutional court from within, diminishing its ability to serve as a guardian of the long-term constitutional order. The analysis demonstrates that the resilience of constitutional democracy cannot be secured by procedural or legal mechanisms alone. It hinges equally on the cultural embeddedness of the rule-of-law norms, the quality and transparency of judicial reasoning, and the ability of courts to structure and manage “political time” amid accelerated media cycles and volatile public expectations. In this regard, courts play a unique moderating role: they are expected to counterbalance short-term political impulses and reintroduce temporal depth into the democratic process. The concluding section proposes a comprehensive set of institutional strategies aimed at reinforcing the resilience of constitutional courts faced with populist challenges. These include enhancing the transparency and communicative clarity of judicial decisions, developing a consistent doctrine of judicial self-restraint, strengthening supranational networks of recognition and cooperation, and expanding deliberative mechanisms such as amicus curiae participation and public hearings. Together, these measures constitute an integrated framework for safeguarding the autonomy and legitimacy of constitutional courts in an era increasingly marked by populist mobilization.

About the author: Alexandru Tănase – Doctor Honoris Causa, Alba Iulia University; Judge and President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova (2011–2017), Member of the Venice Commission (2017–2022), Chisinau, Moldova.

Citation: Tănase A. (2025) Populizm i balans konstitutsionnoy demokratii [Populism and the balance of constitutional democracy]. Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, vol.34, no.4, pp.4–17. (In Russian).

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