Available in Russian
Author: Valentina Chekharina
DOI: 10.21128/1812-7126-2025-4-75-92
Keywords: parliamentary elections in Poland; new coalition government of Poland; Civic Coalition; judicial reform; rule of law; European Commission; Court of Justice of the European Union; National Council of the Judiciary; neo-judges
The ambitious goal of the new Polish coalition government of the Civic Coalition, which won the parliamentary elections in October 2023, was to develop a scenario for restoring the standards of the rule of law, which, according to the ruling coalition and European institutions, were violated by the previous government led by the Law and Justice party, and which are also one of the conditions set by the European Union when it comes to transferring billions of euros from European post-pandemic funds frozen during the Law and Justice party's time in power. The events taking place in Poland after the arrival of the new coalition government have become a subject of concern for various political forces, a subject of disputes and legal uncertainties. On the one hand, there are “radical” proposals regarding the “dismantling” of the current composition of the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Judicial Council, the Supreme Court and the general courts, while on the other hand, the importance of respecting the rule of law during the transition period is emphasized, which is also reflected in the opinions of the Venice Commission on the draft constitutional amendments concerning the Constitutional Tribunal, as well as the regulation of the status of the so-called neo-judges and the draft amendments to the Law on the Public Prosecutor's Office. The Action Plan for Restoring the Rule of Law, presented by the government in February 2024, outlines the commitment to the decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU and the intention to establish a system of institutional execution of judicial decisions. The main points of the planned reforms are aimed at restoring the independence of the judiciary. One of the key ones is the problem of the so-called neo-judges, that is, more than 2,500 judges appointed with the participation of the National Judicial Council, created on the principles changed by the ruling Law and Justice party in 2017, as a result of which it acquired a “politicized” character. However, the new Act on the National Council of the Judiciary, adopted by the Parliament in July 2024, has not entered into force, as the President did not sign it and sent it to the Constitutional Tribunal for preventive review. The problem with the new government’s reforms is that most of the bills adopted by the Parliament were not signed by the previous President, who represented the interests of the Law and Justice party, which prompted the adoption of resolutions of the Sejm on key issues. In February 2025, the Judicial Codification and Public Prosecutor’s Office Commission presented two bills regulating the status of judges appointed after 2018, which caused a wide resonance. The key question is whether the current reforms and the intentions of the new government will survive the political changes associated with the election of a new President of Poland, a supporter of the Law and Justice party, as well as other factors, including the fact that the consequences of decisions regarding the judiciary will determine one or another response of the EU institutions.
About the author: Valentina Chekharina – Candidate of Sciences in Law, Associate Professor, Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia.
Citation: Chekharina V. (2025) Sudebnaya reforma pravitel'stva Pol'shi de lege ferenda: konstitutsionnye turbulentnosti mezhdu parlamentskimi (2023) i prezidentskimi (2025) vyborami [The new Polish government’s judicial reform de lege ferenda: constitutional turbulence between parliamentary (2023) and presidential (2025) elections]. Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe obozrenie, vol.34, no.4, pp.75–92. (In Russian).
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